Institutional objects, such as money, drivers' licenses, and borders, have functions because of their social roles rather than their immediate physical properties. These objects are causally different than standard artifacts (e.g. hammers, chairs, and cars), sharing more commonality with other social roles. Thus, they inform psychological theories of human-made objects as well as children's emerging understanding of social reality. We examined whether children (N = 180, ages 4-9) differentiate institutional objects from standard artifacts. Specifically, we examine whether children understand that mutual intentions (i.e., the intentions of a social collective) underlie the functional affordances of institutional objects in ways that they do not for standard artifacts. We find that young children assimilate institutional objects into their intuitive theories of standard artifacts; children begin to differentiate between the domains in the elementary school years.
Introduction
Institutional objects, such as money, drivers' licenses, and borders have functions because of the roles they are assigned. An extensive body of research has examined how children conceptualize humanmade objects (e.g., Gelman, 2003; Keil, 1989; Margolis & Laurence, 2007; Matan & Carey, 2001) , but this work has focused on standard artifacts, such as simple tools and household objects. Because institutional objects operate by different causal processes, they warrant further investigation. We examine here whether and when these sets of human-made objects are conceptualized differently in children's causal theories.
Standard artifacts have functional affordances that stem from their physical structure, such as the way a hammer's form allows it to deliver force. The functions of institutional objects, by contrast, emerge from the social norms and institutions they are embedded in (Lewis, 1969; Roversi, Borghi, & Tummolini, 2013; Searle, 1995; Searle, 2010) . To illustrate, take the example of money. Money's value is not determined by the paper it is printed on. Rather, people cooperatively assign dollar bills their value; known as a status function (Searle, 1995 (Searle, , 2010 , dollar bills attain value by being collectively recognized as valuable. Status functions confer social powers to their rightful owners. In the case of money, it confers the right to engage in exchange within an economic community. Broadly then, institutional objects seem to comprise a distinct class of objects.
All human-made objects require human beings to come into existence; they do not exist naturally. For standard artifacts, humans cause them to exist and cause them to have the properties they possess through an intentional design process, but the role of intentions is historical (Bloom, 1996; Diaz-Leon, 2015; Matan & Carey, 2001) . That is, once created, the functions they afford stem from their physical structure and so no longer directly depend on human intention. For example, after a hammer has been created, its ability to deliver blows is not affected by its intended use within a cultural context.
Institutional objects, on the other hand, are socially constructed in a more sustained manner (Diaz-Leon, 2015) . Their functional properties are constituted by a community's ongoing mutual intentions. If the community changes its intentions, the object no longer affords the same function. When, in late 2016, India's government elected to invalidate 500 and 1000 rupee notes as a hedge against corruption, the former money because mere paper -even though nothing had changed about its physical form or historical origins.
Theories developed to account for standard artifacts are insufficient to explain the causal processes that govern institutional objects. Previous theories emphasize original intended kind (Bloom, 1996 , 1998 ), design (Kelemen & Carey, 2007 , physical structure (Keil, 1989; Malt & Johnson, 1992; Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris, & Blair, 2000) , or some combination of the above (Chaigneau, Barsalou, & Sloman, 2004) . All fail to capture the unique dynamics of institutional objects. Here we take a developmental approach, exploring children's intuitions about institutional objects. For children to have a mature sense of institutional objects, they need to understand that their functions are based in mutual intentions: a community's intention to assign an object a social role (Searle, 1995) .
